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Abstract: Mainstream educational theory and practice tend to favour what Freire, in Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed, has called ‘banking education’, in which students are seen as depositories of knowledge. But seeing 
pedagogy as a matter of simply communicating knowledge misses the epistemological complexities of our 
relationship with the world. By means of a reading of the Dao De Jing and the Zhuangzi, in this paper I intend to 
explore how the communication of not-knowing may be of central value in teaching and learning. Arguing that our 
lives are characterised by an ‘epistemological chaos’ in which the distinctions between knowing and not-knowing 
can never be firmly established, I suggest that the Daoist texts may allow teachers and students to rethink the 
purpose of education as a matter of yang sheng, or ‘nourishing life, by means of developing skill in dealing with the 
epistemological chaos in which we are immersed. [China Media Research. 2014; 10(4): 10-19] 
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Teaching is even more difficult than learning. We 
know that; but we rarely think about it. And why is 
teaching more difficult than learning? Not because 
the teacher must have a larger store of information, 
and have it always ready. Teaching is more difficult 
than learning because what teaching calls for is this: 
to let learn. The real teacher, in fact, lets nothing 
else be learned than learning. The teacher is ahead 
of his apprentices in this alone, that he has still far 
more to learn than they—he has to learn to let them 
learn. The teacher must be capable of being more 
teachable than his apprentices. The teacher is far 
less assured of his ground than those who learn are 
of theirs. If the relation between the teacher and the 
taught is genuine, therefore, there is never a place 
in it for the authority of the know-it-all or the 
authoritative sway of the official. (Heidegger, 1973, 
p. 15) 
 
I have been a teacher, in one form or another, for a 
decade and a half, teaching students in the disciplines of 
philosophy and creative writing. I came across this 
passage from Heidegger very early on in my life as a 
teacher. At the time, far from assured of my own ground, 
I took comfort from the strange claim that teaching 
requires uncertainty and lack of assurance. If I was not 
particularly assured back then, I could at least take it as 
a sign that I was doing something right. Nevertheless, I 
also found this passage unsettling, because it suggested 
that this lack of assurance could only get worse as time 
went on. 
Fifteen years on, I want to revisit this passage, 
using it as a starting point for rethinking the role of 
assurance and non-assurance, knowing and not-knowing, 
within the context of teaching. In some senses, I am 
indeed more assured than I was when I began teaching. 
At the very least, I am more assured in the fact of not 
being assured, more able to navigate the choppy waters 
where knowing meets not-knowing. But if I am more 
assured in one sense, in another sense, it is clear to me 
that my assurance has diminished over time. In the 
present paper I want to explore the pedagogical 
significance of this double movement of increased 
assurance in one sense, and increased lack of assurance 
in another. 
My approach to this question will be by taking what 
the French philosopher François Jullien (1986; 2004) 
might call a detour through the philosophical texts of 
Daoism, texts that can provide rich resources for 
rethinking the questions of what it means to teach and 
what it means to learn. Stripped down to its bare bones, 
my argument is this: that teaching and learning are at 
their richest and most fruitful when they are not just 
concerned with communicating knowing, but when they 
communicate not-knowing. Thus, a rich educational 
context is one in which knowing and not-knowing, 
assurance and non-assurance swirl around each other 
chaotically; and teaching is as much about 
communicating not-knowing, tentativeness, uncertainty, 
flights of fancy, hypotheses, puzzles, conundrums, 
bafflements and confusions, as it is about 
communicating knowing, assurance, certainty, well- 
mapped paths, proofs, solutions, clarifications, 
illuminations and clarities. 
I am going to refer to this complex swirl as 
‘epistemological chaos’. I am using the notion of 
‘epistemological chaos’ partially as a provocation, but 
not entirely: after all, notions of ‘chaos’ and ‘disorder’ 
in various forms — for example the terms huntun 混屯, 
and luan 亂 — themselves pervade the Daoist texts 
(see Girardot 1978; 2009). Nevertheless, it is clear that 
chaos and disorder are not values that are free from 
ambivalence: they may be disastrous, but equally, they 
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may be productive. So I will not be arguing for the 
necessity of epistemological chaos to the exclusion of 
epistemological order, just as I will not be arguing for 
not-knowing to the exclusion of knowing. Instead, I will 
be arguing that without giving not-knowing and the 
communication of not-knowing their due, and without 
permitting into the classroom what I will be arguing is 
an optimally productive measure of epistemological 
chaos, then teaching risks becoming radically 
impoverished. 
But why should giving epistemological chaos more 
space in the classroom be desirable, and how might 
embracing such chaos enrich teaching? The answer to 
these questions, I think, lies in the fact that our lives 
themselves are pervaded by a large degree of 
epistemological chaos. Teaching, as I understand it here, 
is not a matter of taming this chaos, but instead of 
developing and communicating new understandings— 
on the part of both teachers and students—of how to 
effectively deal with this epistemological chaos, without 
necessarily attempting to straighten it out and to replace 
it with some kind of perfect epistemological order. 
This approach to pedagogy puts me at odds with 
certain mainstream models of teaching, and certainly it 
with what Freire (2000) has scathingly called the 
‘banking education’ model. Freire (2000) writes as 
follows: 
 
Education thus becomes an act of depositing, in 
which the students are the depositories and the 
teacher is the depositor. Instead of communicating, 
the teacher issues communiques and makes 
deposits which the students patiently receive, 
memorize, and repeat. This is the “banking” 
concept of education, in which the scope of action 
allowed to the students extends only as far as 
receiving, filing, and storing the deposits. (p.72) 
 
Despite several decades of educational theory since 
Freire’s book, this model remains the basic model 
underpinning day-to-day practices within universities, 
where teaching is a matter of ‘delivering content’, and 
where universities work with the world of business in 
‘knowledge transfer’. Knowledge, in such a system, is a 
kind of stuff to be heaped up, or moved hither and 
thither according to often blatantly economic demands. 
Freire’s alternative to ‘banking’ education is a form of 
education based upon a thoroughgoing commitment to 
dialogue. Freire writes that those wishing to break with 
the banking model, ‘must abandon the educational goal 
of deposit-making and replace it with the posing of the 
problems of human beings in their relations with the 
world’ by means of a critical and dialogical approach to 
education. 
And yet there is, I believe, some virtue in banking 
education: I am grateful for much of the knowledge that 
I have had deposited in me during my education. 
Similarly, there is also virtue in dialogue. But I become 
worried when a single model of education rules alone, 
when only one strand is plucked out of this seething sea 
of epistemological chaos, and is set up as the model or 
authority that must be followed. In this paper I am not 
offering a fully worked-out model of my own; instead, I 
am attempting to loosen the grip of some existing 
models by looking at the complex and subtle tides and 
cross-currents of our engagement with the world, as we 
mutually teach and learn. Rather than attempting to 
privilege not-knowing over knowing, or favouring only 
one kind of epistemological relationship, I will be 
arguing that, given that we are beings who are already 
irredeemably immersed in epistemological chaos, any 
form of education that seeks to be useful for human life 
must be broad enough to embrace this chaos. 
 
Heidegger, Daoism and Teaching 
Heidegger’s thoughts on education appear in his 
essay What is Called Thinking? (Was heisst Denken?), 
which is derived from a lecture course delivered 
between 1951 and 1952. It is no accident that this was 
the course Heidegger chose to teach shortly after his 
post-war ban on teaching was lifted. Forbidden from 
teaching after the war by the de-Nazification committee, 
Heidegger underwent a period of depression and 
breakdown (Safranski, 1999), and only returned to 
teaching in 1951. Given this fraught context, it is also 
perhaps no surprise that this passage on teaching 
appears in the very earliest part of the course. The 
questions of what it meant to teach, and what it meant 
not to teach, must have pressing ones for Heidegger at 
the time. In the light of this context, there is perhaps 
something disturbing about Heidegger’s essay. 
Heidegger’s pedagogical style was always dangerously 
authoritative (Peterson, 2005), and this air of authority 
can be seen even at the point where Heidegger disavows 
it. Whilst there is something compelling and persuasive 
in this notion of developing skill in teaching as 
involving a loss in assurance, by claiming himself to be 
more teachable than his students, it seems that 
Heidegger is clearly asserting his own higher authority. 
One might assume that here Heidegger—whose 
own connections with the traditions of Daoism are 
complex (Hirsch, 1970; Ma, 2005, 2006, 2009; Ma & 
van Brakel, 2006; May, 1996; Zhang, 2006)—is already 
drawing upon the traditions of Daoist thought. After all, 
Heidegger’s relationship with the Daoist texts reaches 
back to well before the Second World War. Otto 
Pöggeler points out that already in 1930 Heidegger was 
referring to the Zhuangzi, which was available in Martin 
Buber’s German translation, drawing during the course 
of a discussion on intersubjectivity upon the text’s 
famous parable about the joy of fishes (Pöggeler, 1992). 
This engagement with Daoism intensified after the 
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Second World War ended, in the period during which 
Heidegger underwent the de-Nazification process. This 
deeper engagement with Daoism, and in particular with 
the Dao De Jing, Pöggeler writes, began not ‘as a result 
of universal and neutral historical contemplation, but 
rather in a quite definite context’ (Parkes, 1992, p. 51). 
It was also during this time Heidegger started to 
collaborate with the philosopher, theologian and 
translator Paul Hsiao Shih-yi (蕭師毅) on a translation 
of the Dao De Jing (Ma, 2006). 
Writing in Parkes (1992), Hsiao gives a curious 
account of their collaboration, ranging between 
philosophy, personal and political reflection, and tales 
of clairvoyant ducks. In this account Hsiao talks of how 
he encountered Heidegger in the spring of 1946 in the 
Holzmarktplatz in Freiburg, finding the philosopher in 
what seems to have been a state of mental disarray. 
Hsiao quoted some lines from Mencius, which seemed 
to move Heidegger, who then proposed that they 
translate the Dao De Jing together. Heidegger and 
Hsiao worked through the summer of 1946, eventually 
producing a translation of only eight of the eighty-one 
chapters. Hsiao writes that Heidegger was relentlessly 
painstaking, noting dryly that, ‘Presumably we would 
have finished in a decade or so’ (Hsiao, 1992, p. 97). It 
is perhaps no surprise, then, that the project ground to a 
halt as the summer came to a close, with Hsiao 
admitting later to a ‘slight anxiety that Heidegger’s 
notes might perhaps go beyond what is called for in a 
translation’ (p. 98). Hsiao’s essay ends with a degree of 
ambivalence towards Heidegger, and with the 
suggestion of some relief that the project came to an 
end.  
Despite this evidence of earlier engagement with 
Daoist sources, and despite what may seem to be 
superficial parallels between Daoist themes and tropes 
and the content of Heidegger’s essay on teaching, there 
is no clear evidence of either direct or indirect influence. 
Explicit references to Daoist thought appear in 
Heidegger’s published works only later in the 1950s. 
Whilst some commentators, for example Zhongjie Wu 
(2011), have pointed out an affinity between the passage 
I quoted at the opening of this essay and traditional 
Chinese discourses of teaching and learning (although, 
interestingly, in the context of Confucian rather than 
Daoist texts), for present purposes, rather than 
attempting to demonstrate whether there may be any 
lines of influence here, I am far more interested in the 
way that—whatever influence there may or may not 
be—the Daoist philosophical texts may be able to help 
with exploring more concretely the paradoxes of 
teaching that Heidegger raises.  
First I will explore these paradoxes by looking at 
the relationship between knowing and not-knowing in 
the Dao De Jing of Laozi. Then I will move on to 
consider how the Zhuangzi tackles a similar set of 
problems. Finally, I will conclude by proposing that the 
richest and most fruitful approaches to pedagogy might 
be those that are more messy and epistemologically 
chaotic than can be easily captured in the net of single 
educational theories, and certainly more messy and 
chaotic than is approved of within public discourses on 
the nature of teaching and learning. 
 
Knowing and Not Knowing in the Dao De Jing 
My focus for the remainder of this paper will be 
upon what in Chinese is called zhi 知, a term that is 
often translated into English as ‘knowledge’, but which 
can have a broader range of meanings, from 
‘consciousness’ or ‘awareness’ to ‘wisdom.’ I am 
interested in zhi not only as a positive quality, not only 
in terms of its presence, but also negatively, in terms of 
its absence or its negation. I am as interested in 
not-knowing as I am in knowing. 
Not-knowing is particularly at issue in the 
seventy-first chapter of the Dao De Jing. The opening 
sentence in the original Chinese reads, ‘知不知上；不
知知病’, D.C. Lau (1963) renders this line as follows: 
‘To know yet to think that one does not know is best; 
Not to know yet to think that one knows will lead to 
difficulty.’ For all its clarity, Lau’s translation perhaps 
introduces elements that should not be there in the 
original (in particular that ‘yet to think’). Drawing upon 
a composite version of the text that differs slightly in its 
details (知不知尚矣；不知知病矣), Hall and Ames 
(2003) prefer, ‘Knowing that one does not know is 
knowing at its best / But not knowing that one knows is 
suffering from a disease.’ A more curious tack is taken 
by Hans-Georg Moeller, in his fascinating paper 
‘Knowledge as Addiction: A Comparative Analysis’ 
(2007), where the negative in the second phrase finds 
itself doubled up, thus rendering the passage as ‘To 
know not-knowing— / this is the highest. / To not know 
not-knowing / this is a blemish.’ Although the move 
from not knowing knowing in the second phrase to not 
knowing not-knowing is perhaps contentious, Moeller 
does seem to be in agreement with Hall and Ames that 
the first phrase concerns not a contradiction between 
what one knows and what one thinks one knows, as in 
Lau’s translation, but instead a kind of knowledge that 
is knowing not-knowing. 
Leaving aside the doubling of negatives in 
Moeller’s version, this may all sound rather Socratic 
when translated into the context of Western thought. 
But there are, I think, significant differences between 
the not-knowing that is talked about here, and the 
not-knowing of Socrates. The Socrates of the Apology is 
on certain ground, because his knowledge of his own 
not-knowing gives him both assurance and authority. He 
is ahead of all the others who only think they know 
when they do not. And when the Platonic dialogues are 
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read in the light of the Dao De Jing, it seems that 
Socrates does not push the logic of not-knowing all the 
way to its conclusion. The question that nobody asks of 
Socrates is this: how do you know that you don’t know? 
We will return to these questions in a moment; but 
what I want to do here is to raise another question. The 
Socratic framework tends to take knowledge as an 
unquestioned good: the issue is not with the value of 
knowledge, but with whether one can or cannot be 
really said to know. But Moeller’s perspective on the 
Dao De Jing is interesting because it suggests that our 
concern with knowledge—which goes so far as to be an 
addiction—may itself be a serious problem. To 
illuminate this point further, Moeller draws upon 
chapter three of the Dao De Jing, part of which reads as 
follows:  
 
是以聖人之治，虛其心，實其腹，弱其志，強
其骨。常使民無知無欲。 
 
Lau’s translation is, ‘Therefore in governing the 
people, the sage empties their minds but fills their 
bellies, weakens their wills but strengthens their bones. / 
He always keeps them innocent of knowledge and free 
from desire…’. Meanwhile, Moeller translates the 
passage, ‘Therefore the ordering of the sage is such: / 
He empties their hearts; / he fills their bellies. / He 
weakens their wishes; / he strengthens their bones. / 
Persistently he makes the people have no knowledge 
and no desires’. 
Here the differences with the Western tradition ever 
since Socrates are clear. To be sure, Socrates claims not 
to know, but he does not critique the desire to know 
itself. What he critiques is the false claim to know when 
one does not. Indeed, at the end of his rigorous 
questioning, he often recommends his interlocutors 
should keep on seeking knowledge. Similarly, absence 
of knowledge in Aristotle, if it is a deficiency, can 
nevertheless be a noble deficiency: the nobility lies in 
the way that absence of knowledge translates into a 
thirst to know, and in the way this thirst to know 
translates into knowledge. Moeller writes that for 
Aristotle, ‘The human strive for knowledge serves to 
distinguish this species from animals that do not, at least 
apparently, have such a desire. Aristotle praises the 
intellectual curiosity that was, for him, so significant for 
being human’. The source for this, of course, is the 
famous opening of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 980a, where 
the philosopher writes, ‘All men by nature desire to 
know’ (McKeon, 2001, p. 689). This desire to know is 
the wonder (thaumazein θαυμάζειν) that is said to lie at 
the root of philosophy. Wonder, curiosity and the thirst 
for knowledge are positive values, precisely because 
they contribute to more and better knowledge. 
Laozi takes a different tack, raising more 
fundamental questions about the value of this hunger to 
know and about the virtue of heaping up knowledge: the 
parallels between the appetite for food, and the appetite 
for knowing are striking. Moeller (2007) takes the 
example of our mass-media consumption in which we 
find ourselves caught up by multiple ongoing stories 
and narratives, so desperate to know what happens next 
that we are caught in a ‘hamster’s wheel’ in which ‘the 
movement of information is entirely ours—but it does 
not get us anywhere. Knowledge becomes all-pervasive 
and meaningless at the same time’ (p. 9). The desire to 
know is not an unquestionable good. 
In this light, the nobility of the Aristotelian call to 
wonder begins to look rather more questionable. It 
becomes apparent that whilst there may be a value in 
knowing, there is also a value in not-knowing, in 
breaking this cycle of hunger for the accumulation of 
knowledge. Much of the knowledge we accumulate 
does not conduce to our nourishment. As the singer 
Tom Waits once put it, there is a wisdom in 
recognising—when faced with the great and endless 
accumulation of information to which we are 
subjected—that, ‘There’s a lot of things in this world / 
You’re gonna have no use for.’ 
Returning to the passage above, the expressions 
wuzhi 無知 and wuyu 無欲 are examples of what Hall 
and Ames, in their introduction to their philosophical 
reading of the Dao De Jing (2003), refer to as wu-forms, 
in that they make use of the negating particle wu 無 
(‘there is not’). Alongside these two wu-forms, there 
also appear wuming 無名 or wu-naming, wuxin 無心 
or wu-‘heart and mind’ and, most famously of all, 
wuwei 無為 or wu-action. Hall and Ames (2003) read 
these wu-forms not as abstractions or metaphysical 
concepts, but instead as what they call ‘optimum 
dispositions of the Daoist self’ (p. 44). Thus when it 
comes to the wu-form that concerns us here—wuzhi 無
知  (not-knowing, or lacking-knowledge)—Hall and 
Ames gloss the term as ‘a sort of knowing without 
resort to rules or principles’ or, more briefly, an 
unprincipled knowing. This unprincipled knowing, they 
write, is a knowledge that is ‘the acceptance of the 
world on its own terms without recourse to rules of 
discrimination’. 
Whilst this reading of the term does give a sense of 
the positive valence of wuzhi in Daoist thought, at the 
same time it feels to me as if it risks turning wuzhi into 
another form of zhi, making not-knowing simply 
another kind of knowing. If one reads the Dao De Jing 
in the light of Moeller’s concern with the addiction to 
knowledge, it is hard not to suspect that Hall and Ames 
are themselves (as are most scholars) too much subject 
to this addiction to really recognise the value of 
not-knowing. 
There are several strategies that Western scholars 
have taken when encountering this wuzhi. Some 
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scholars, like Hall and Ames, seek to turn this 
not-knowing into a kind of knowing. The more 
mystically-inclined might follow Louis Komjathy 
(2013), who glosses wuzhi as a kind of knowing rooted 
in ‘meditative praxis and the resulting mystical 
experiences and spiritual insights’ (p. 112). Whilst this 
may be true of later Daoism, it seems to me that to read 
the term like this in the context of the Dao De Jing is 
unwarranted. Others have taken the emphasis wuzhi as a 
sign of the thoroughgoing scepticism of the Daoist texts. 
Thus Hansen writes that we can treat the ‘central 
doctrine’ of the Dao De Jing not as ‘mystical 
metaphysics but as linguistic skepticism’ (2003, 
pp.222-223). Hansen sees the text as a thoroughgoing 
attempt to reverse conventional judgements, not to 
promote opposing judgements, but to help us realise, 
‘that we can never take any fixed discourse as a guide in 
all circumstances’ (ibid.). 
My own approach, instead of either privileging any 
kind of knowing too strongly, or becoming too strongly 
focussed on the notion of not-knowing, is to explore 
how it might be possible to think through the question 
of what it means to know or understand and what it 
means to pass on this knowledge or understanding, 
without giving significantly greater weight to either 
knowing or unknowing. And here I suspect that Steve 
Coutinho’s (2013) notion of ‘optimal minimising’ may 
be useful. Coutinho (2013) writes that the semantic 
function of wu in the Laozi is, ‘to optimally minimise 
the clarity and determinacy of the concept it modifies’ 
(p. 58). In this sense, the Dao De Jing’s references to 
wuzhi or not-knowing imply neither a different kind of 
knowledge, nor a form of scepticism; instead they 
recommend that in relation to knowledge we have ‘a 
minimal amount necessary to cooperate symbiotically 
with our environments’ (ibid.). 
Whilst it is true that the question of the precise 
point at which knowledge can be said to be optimally 
minimised is very hard to judge, at least for non-sages 
(and most of us are, alas, non-sages), nevertheless the 
notion of optimally minimised knowledge can serve two 
purposes. Firstly, it can act for the non-sagely as a 
reminder there is something non-optimal in the 
storing-up of great quantities of knowledge like grain in 
a grain-store. It can remind us that when it comes to the 
broad field of our epistemological relationships with the 
world, we might do well to take both knowing and 
not-knowing seriously, to still our addiction to the 
accumulation of knowledge, and to ask: what is optimal 
here? And secondly, it can serve to remind us that this 
broad epistemological field is far fuzzier and harder to 
define than we often think. Often it is not that we know 
or we don’t know, but instead—as Brook Ziporyn (2013) 
has pointed out—that we ‘sort-of’ know. Sort-of 
knowing is a swirling dance in which knowing and 
not-knowing cannot always be distinguished. The kind 
of pedagogy I am interested in, and the kind that I think 
is most fruitful, is the kind of pedagogy that takes this 
sort-of knowing seriously. But this notion of sort-of 
knowing leads us away from the Dao De Jing, and 
towards the epistemological chaos of the Zhuangzi.  
 
Knowing and Not-knowing in the Zhuangzi 
Knowing and not-knowing are, if anything, even 
more at issue in the Zhuangzi than they are in the Dao 
De Jing. This the text repeatedly circles around 
questions of knowing and not-knowing, without ever 
settling on either not-knowing or knowing as a resting 
place. A large part of the Zhuangzi’s value and 
fascination, I would suggest, lies in the fact that is a 
work that is embodies epistemological chaos, and thus 
reflects the epistemological chaos of our lives. It is a 
work that can give us an insight into this 
epistemological chaos, so that we can find ways of 
responding to it. In other words, the Zhuangzi can be 
seen to dramatise the epistemological chaos that is ours 
by virtue of being human. It wanders, free and easy, 
through this chaos, moving between knowing, 
not-knowing and sort-of knowing, without ever telling 
the reader where, precisely, it is going. And yet I 
believe it is possible, from this epistemological chaos of 
the text, to extract some kind of guidance about how we 
might respond to the broader epistemological chaos of 
our lives.  
As a starting point, I want to consider the following 
debate between Nie Que (whose name literally means 
‘toothless’) and Wang Ni, which appears in the second 
chapter, ‘Equalizing Assessments of Things’ (Qi wu lun 
齊物論). 
 
齧缺問乎王倪曰：「子知物之所同是乎？」曰：
「吾惡乎知之！」「子知子之所不知邪？」曰：
「吾惡乎知之！」「然則物無知邪？」曰：「吾
惡乎知之！雖然，嘗試言之。庸詎知吾所謂知
之非不知邪？庸詎知吾所謂不知之非知邪？」 
 
In Ziporyn’s translation, the debate goes as follows: 
 
Niu Que asked Wang Ni, ‘Do you know what all 
things agree in considering right?’ 
Wang Ni said, ‘How could I know that?’ 
Niu Que said, ‘Do you know that you don’t know?’ 
Wang Ni said, ‘How could I know that?’ 
Qiu Que said, ‘Then are all beings devoid of 
knowledge?’ 
Wang Ni said, ‘How could I know that? Still, let 
me try to say something about this. How could I 
know that what I call “knowing” is not really 
“not-knowing”? How could I know that what I call 
“not-knowing” is not really “knowing”?’ (Ziporyn, 
2009, p. 17) 
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The first thing to note is that it is not being 
maintained here that all beings lack knowledge, or that 
knowledge is somehow impossible. Instead, something 
more complex is going on. It is not that Wang Ni refutes 
knowledge altogether. Instead he asks: how can we 
know for sure what we claim to know? This is not a 
refutation of knowledge, but instead a kind of hesitation 
about knowledge claims. But there is much more at 
stake here than a pulling-back before making firm 
knowledge claims, because if we do not know whether 
what we call knowing is, or isn’t, really not-knowing, 
then the reverse is also true, and neither do we really 
know whether or not what we call not-knowing is 
actually knowing. Here we move beyond Socratic 
not-knowing into something more epistemologically 
chaotic, and find that knowing and not-knowing are 
always bound up together in ways that we cannot fully 
grasp. As Ziporyn (2013) writes — 
 
Nonknowing, then, is a kind of union of knowing 
and not-knowing, of the ‘human’ and the 
‘heavenly’— or, more strictly, not a union, which 
might suggest an achieved synthesis, but rather an 
openness to the free flow of knowing and 
nonknowing, so that ‘neither wins out’ once and for 
all, neither is the definitive answer to the questions, 
‘What is this? Is it knowing or is it nonknowing?’ 
Since every perspective knows only itself, all 
knowing is also nonknowing, yet nonknowing is 
always presented as a form of knowing, so we can 
never know which is which. (ppp. 119-120). 
 
If this is right, then it suggests that our relationship 
to the world is always going to be epistemologically 
chaotic because we will never be able to fully 
disentangle those matted skeins of knowing and 
not-knowing. And this naturally applies, although they 
would hate to admit it, to even the most rigorous of 
philosophers. Of course, this is not to say that sort-of 
knowledge is impossible. There are ways in which we 
can clear away some of this disorder and chaos to create 
temporary pools of order. But the broader field is not 
something that we can straighten out. It might serve us 
well, then—as Wong (2005) points out in his discussion 
of the epistemological chaos of the Zhuangzi—to wean 
ourselves away from our obsession with always being 
right, even if we might hope to be, at least some of the 
time, sort-of right, or at least sort-of not-wrong.  
This being the case, the skilful educator would be 
one who understands that not-knowing always 
accompanies knowing, and who is skilled not only in 
navigating this epistemological chaos, but also in 
leading students through it. This already puts a bit 
more flesh on the bones of Heidegger’s claim that the 
teacher is always further ahead than his or her students. 
But if this is true, we should perhaps also ask this: to 
what end? If education is not just a matter of the 
accumulation of knowledge, what can it usefully do? 
Why become skilled in navigating epistemological 
chaos? One persuasive answer to this, I think, can be 
found in the next chapter of the Zhuangzi, Yang sheng 
zhu 養生主, which Ziporyn translates as ‘The Primacy 
of Nourishing Life’. The chapter begins with the 
following warning. 
 
吾生也有涯，而知也無涯。以有涯隨無涯，殆
已。已而為知者，殆而已矣。 
 
Ziporyn (2009) translates the passage as follows:  
 
The flow of my life is bound by its limits; the mind 
bent on knowledge, however, never is. If forced to 
follow something limited by no bounds, the 
bounded [current of life] is put in danger. And to 
meet this danger by enhancing knowledge even 
further—that merely exacerbates the danger. (p. 21) 
 
Ziporyn points out that sheng refers to the 
processes of living: it is active and always underway. 
The Zhuangzi is not interested in knowledge as 
information that is stored in great grain-stores; instead it 
is interested in the embodied knowing of our everyday 
lives. This is not bare theory. Instead, the reminder of 
the boundedness of this process of living could be read 
as an injunction to consider how our addiction to 
knowledge might impede this flow. In other words, the 
pursuit of endless heaping-up of knowledge risks 
narrowing life’s rich flow and impeding our ability to 
nourish our lives. 
François Jullien (2007) writes, in his study of the 
concept of yang sheng 養生, or ‘nourishing one’s life’ 
that, contrary to the Aristotelian tradition, Chinese 
thought ‘deliberately turned away from the activity of 
knowing, which is endless and thus hemorrhagic in 
terms of energy and vitality, in order to concentrate on 
man’s ability to use and preserve the vital potential 
vested in him’ (p. 15). This should not, however, be 
taken to be an injunction to entirely turn away from the 
activity of knowing. Knowledge is important in the 
Zhuangzi, but it is important within the broader context 
of this nourishment of vitality. If knowing can 
contribute to this vital nourishment, then it is to be 
encouraged; but the quest for knowledge for its own 
sake, the addiction to knowledge, is simply a 
squandering of energy, for the simple reason that this 
quest has no end point or natural terminus. It is strange, 
in a Western context, to think that there might be a 
criterion for knowing enough; but it seems to me that 
there is such a criterion in the Zhuangzi, and this 
criterion is that of whether knowing more will conduce 
to yang sheng, to the nourishment of life.  
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This raises the question of what kind of knowing it 
is that can support the nourishing of life. Here I’m 
going to look at two different aspects of this knowing. 
The first is the well-worn distinction—raised by many 
commentators on the Dao De Jing and the 
Zhuangzi—between knowing that and knowing how, a 
distinction first made in this form by Gilbert Ryle in 
1949 in his book The Concept of Mind. The second 
aspect is the distinction that is made in the Zhuangzi 
between great-knowing (dazhi 大 知 ) and small- 
knowing (xiaozhi 小知). 
The distinction between knowing-that and 
knowing-how is often made with reference to the 
famous passage about the cook Ding and his carving of 
the ox. The story, which is well-known, is that Ding—a 
cook or butcher—is carving an ox for the ruler Wen Hui, 
which he does with such consummate skill, sliding his 
knife between the joints and bones and ligaments, that 
the blade has never needed sharpening in nineteen years. 
After Ding describes to the ruler how he carves the ox, 
Wen Hui replies, ‘How excellent! I have heard cook 
Ding’s words, and attained understanding of how to 
nourish life!’ 
This a complex tale, replete with ironies and 
uncertainties. Can the carving of a dead ox be a model 
for thinking about the nourishing of life? Is there a 
significance in the fact that the ox is carved for the 
purposes of nourishment? And what might this story tell 
us about teaching? After all, does Wen Hui truly attain 
to understanding, or does he only think he does? One 
thing that is clear is that if this is a passage about 
knowledge, as D’Ambrosio (2007) argues in his paper 
on the Zhuangzi and educational communication, it is 
not about propositional knowledge: 
 
Knowing, according to the Zhuangzi, is not a matter 
of knowing what, but rather knowing how. In 
knowing how, one is concerned with “tracing out 
and mapping . . . productive patterns” which 
requires realizing the actual normative practices of 
(in this case) the system. More importantly, 
knowing how is always already according to a 
certain perspective at a certain time, and therefore 
somewhat subjective and expected to change with 
time or place. The how cannot be generalised or 
idealised. (p. 41). 
 
Ryle’s distinction is useful, but it would not do to 
press it too far. Huang (2010) points out that ‘knowing 
how’ in the Zhuangzi (as in the rest of life) may require 
a degree of ‘knowing that’. Indeed, if we take practical 
action, it is sometimes unclear where the boundary 
between ‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing that’ lies: if I am 
baking a cake, and the oven needs to be turned to a 
particular temperature, is this ‘knowing how’ to set the 
temperature properly, ‘knowing that’ the temperature 
should be such-and-such, or both of these? When it 
comes to our embodied, everyday knowledge, there is 
no clear distinction between ‘knowing how’ and 
‘knowing that’. It may even be that ‘knowing that’ is a 
particular instance, as Hansen (1981) has argued, of 
‘knowing how’, of having the know-how that goes 
along with a particular linguistic and intellectual skill. 
What is of more interest here is not the precise 
delimitation of the boundary between ‘knowing that’ 
and ‘knowing how’, but instead the question of how 
knowledge may be optimally minimised. Whilst 
baking a cake, I might know all kinds of things in 
theory about the baking of cakes; but all of this 
learning is potentially a squandering of energy, and too 
much knowledge, or knowledge badly deployed, may 
even make me a bad cook. Cook Ding, too, is no doubt 
in possession of a lot of propositional knowledge; but 
it doesn’t interfere with his know-how. This, I think, is 
the crux of the matter. There is propositional 
knowledge that clogs and blocks the flow of effective 
action; and there is propositional knowledge that 
supports effective action. The question for educators is 
this: how one can make sure ‘knowing that’ effectively 
serves or nourishes the flow of life, rather than 
blocking it? In other words, what might the optimally 
minimal level of ‘knowing that’ be to support, rather 
than clog, the broader field of ‘knowing how’?  
This brings me to dazhi or great-knowing and 
xiaozhi or small-knowing. To put this distinction in 
context, it will be necessary to look for a moment at 
what many commentators have identified as the 
perspectivist outlook of the Zhuangi. The Zhuangzi is 
extraordinarily attentive to the idea of knowledge as 
being rooted in specific, embodied perspectives, 
whether this is the knowledge possessed by great 
mythical birds soaring through the sky, by cicadas and 
fledgling doves, by fish in the stream, or by 
philosophers strolling by on the bank. This 
perspectivism is not so much a thoroughgoing 
relativism as it is a recognition of the locatedness and of 
the singularity of any knowing being. We know what 
we know because of where we happen to be located, 
and because of our own singular propensities, 
tendencies and constitutions. Tim Connolly (2011) 
points out that perspectivism is a way of knowing in the 
Zhuangzi, however this does not go quite far enough, 
for perspectivism in the Zhuangzi is ultimately the only 
way of knowing: there is no aperspectival knowledge, 
no view-from-nowhere. The first chapter of the 
Zhuangzi, Xiao yao you 逍遙遊 or ‘Wandering Free 
and Unfettered’ sets up the problem of perspectival 
knowledge with a strange tale about the giant fish called 
Kun, who lives in the Northern Darkness. Ziporyn 
points out that the name in Chinese, kun 鯤, also means 
‘fish-egg’ (or perhaps we could say, to preserve the joke, 
‘tiddler’). This great fish transforms into the bird Peng 
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(鵬) and soars to the Southern Darkness. From the point 
of view of the hopping cicada and fledgling dove, 
Peng’s soaring is incomprehensible, to the extent that 
they laugh at the bird’s vast bulk. Karyn Lynne Lai 
(2006) writes that, ‘the smallness of their prospect 
blinds them to the magnificence of the giant bird’. She 
goes on to argue:  
 
On the other hand, the sweeping perspective is not 
necessarily to be preferred. The giant bird may be 
large and impressive, but it cannot take flight unless 
the wind conditions are right. It is capable only of a 
broad view and is unable to discern finer details. It, 
too, has only a partial perspective. Zhuangzi does 
not demonstrate preference for either. (Lai, 2006, p. 
369) 
 
However, a perspectivist method that argued on the 
equivalence and equal benefit of all perspectives for 
human life would be self-undermining. It would be 
self-undermining because it would fail to recognise that 
human beings necessarily have their own particular 
natural capacities, tendencies and quirks. Just as much 
as the great bird Peng, or the leaping quail, we 
necessarily have our own rather limited range of 
perspectives, and these perspectives arise out of our 
being the kinds of beings that we are. We cannot fully 
assume the perspective of Peng, nor that of a cicada. If 
the perspectives that are open to us as human beings are 
mutable, they are not infinitely so. Many perspectives 
are closed to us. However, the perspectivism of the 
Zhuangzi does not claim that there is only one human 
perspective, and so there is room for the forming of 
preferences about alternative perspectives in the 
Zhuangzi, even if these preferences cannot be absolutely 
grounded. 
The question then is this: given the kinds of 
perspectives that are open to us as human beings, which 
perspectives are preferable? And the answer if clear: 
those that are preferable are the perspectives that help 
up to make our way better in the world, allowing us a 
more free and easy wandering, conducing more to the 
nourishing of our lives. Connolly (2011) puts it like this: 
‘The aims of the perspectivist method Zhuangzi 
uses—finding worth in things, dealing with the dangers 
of political life, learning one’s limits and 
capacities—might all be summed up under the heading 
of “getting along in the world”’ (p. 502). And the 
perspectives that enable us to get along rather better are 
precisely those that could be said to arise from dazhi or 
great-knowing, rather than from xiaozhi or 
small-knowing. 
Thus, generally speaking, the preferred perspectives 
from out those of which we are capable, are those that 
more broader and expansive, and less cramped and 
narrow. Connolly (2011) writes: 
[I]f we take ‘greater knowledge’ [dazhi] to be the 
pivotal notion in the text, the fundamental value in 
Zhuangzi’s philosophy is one of breadth. All of the 
values mentioned seem to arise from this one: 
experience with multiple ways of life makes a 
person hesitant to succumb to narrow political 
ambitions, humble in the face of what he knows or 
does not know, and capable of finding 
hitherto-unknown uses for things. All of these 
secondary values are perhaps subject to later 
revaluation. But breadth itself is unique in that it is 
in principle beyond this sort of revision. Any 
subsequent attempts to devalue breadth would be 
self-negating, since this would involve adopting 
some further perspective. (p. 503) 
 
Or, as Donald Sturgeon (forthcoming, 2015) argues, 
it is indeed possible to improve our epistemic situation 
by including a broader range of perspectives; and yet at 
the same time to set this as a goal may lead us astray, 
for the attempt to too forcefully improve our epistemic 
situation may risk cramping our abilities to yang sheng, 
or to attend to the natural flow of our life. 
 
Conclusion 
Having taken what is a relatively free and easy 
wandering course through the Dao De Jing and the 
Zhuangzi, in the conclusion to this essay I want to return 
to the question of pedagogy and to rethink what it might 
mean to teach and to learn in the light of these texts. 
The first thing to say is that, for all the problems 
with Heidegger’s own pedagogy, in the light of the 
Daoist texts, his insight into teacherly non-assurance is 
worth taking seriously. There is a process of lessening 
assurance that goes with a deeper engagement with 
questions of knowledge and its value. The deeper one 
knows, the more one is open to qualifications, 
hesitations, exceptions and uncertainties. 
The second comment I want to make here is those 
who teach owe it to their students to do more than just 
pass on information. To teach well, it is perhaps 
necessary to take not-knowing seriously; and to take 
not-knowing seriously means seeing it as more than a 
flaw that can be eradicated by the accumulation of 
further knowledge, or a spur to further inquiry. To take 
not-knowing seriously involves understanding that it is 
a constant component of our epistemological 
relationship with the world in which—whether you are a 
student or a teacher—you are always, as Ziporyn (2013) 
so elegantly puts it, ‘Sort of knowing what anything is, 
sort of not knowing what anything is. Sort of knowing 
what you are doing, sort of not knowing what you are 
doing’ (p. 125). 
Thirdly, in the light of this recognition of the 
importance of not-knowing, to teach might be also to 
communicate to students in such a way as to minimise 
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the dangers of the addiction to knowledge. By 
remembering that ‘knowing that’ is perhaps at its most 
richly significant when it is put in the service of ‘knowing 
how’, students might then learn to see how they can 
optimally minimise knowledge in such a way that they 
can attend more broadly to the nourishment of their lives, 
avoiding the perils of epistemological sclerosis.  
Fourthly, the Daoist-inspired educator might 
encourage students towards a greater breadth and 
towards broader contextualisations of their knowledge 
and activity. The field of knowing-how, in other words, 
is the broad field of nourishing the flow of life, in 
oneself and in others. Narrowness may close us off to 
unsettling uncertainties, it is true; but it also cuts off the 
flow of life and makes knowledge small. 
Fifthly, it seems to me that the Daoist texts, in their 
concern with not-knowing and sort-of knowing, point to 
the fact that epistemological chaos is inescapable; and 
anybody who is sets themselves up as a teacher by 
pretending that this chaos does not exist or does not 
matter will not be able to truly attend to the matter of 
teaching. When it comes to the business of nourishing 
the flow of life in the classroom, to deny this 
epistemological chaos is, to paraphrase Freire, to fail to 
really pose the problems of human beings in their 
relations with the world. 
Finally, given that this is a paper written for a 
scholarly journal, I should say there is something 
paradoxical about trying to argue in a sober and 
epistemologically tidy fashion for the value of 
epistemological chaos. Scholarly journals are locales of 
epistemological order in a wider sea of swirling 
epistemological chaos; but this should not blind us to 
the fact that in the world outside, the swirl goes on. 
So let me end with a story. Some months ago, an 
unusually troubled student knocked on my door. He was 
fiercely intelligent, decidedly wayward, hopeless at 
following directives, usually most noticeable in class 
only by his absence. I invited him into my office. He sat 
down. ‘I hate this,’ he said, without much introduction. 
‘All of it. I hate it.’ 
‘Why?’ I asked. 
‘Because every day people stand in front of me and 
tell me stuff that they claim to know, but they don’t 
really know at all. And it depresses the hell out of me.’ 
I shrugged. ‘Why have you come to talk to me?’ I 
asked. 
‘Because in your last lecture you admitted that you 
don’t really know that much at all.’ 
‘Is that a problem?’ I asked him. ‘Me not knowing 
much?’ 
He thought for a few moments. ‘No,’ he said finally. 
‘It is a relief.’ 
And then miraculously—somewhere between 
knowing, not-knowing and sort-of-knowing—a space 
for teaching and for learning began to open up. 
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